Generations, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the RPMA by Bunker, Robert J.
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CGU Faculty Publications and Research CGU Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1996
Generations, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of
Warfare and the RPMA
Robert J. Bunker
Claremont Graduate University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bunker, Robert J. "Generations, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the RPMA." Airpower Journal 10.1 (1996): 18-28. Print.
Generations, Waves, and Epochs

MODES OF WARFARE AND THE RPMA*

DR ROBERT J. BUNKER 
THE PUBLICATION of the article written by Col Owen E. Jensen, USAF, entitled “Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War” in the 
Winter 1994 issue of Airpower Journal represents a 
significant event. Tofflerian concepts, which have 
gained so much credence with the Army, are now be-
ginning to openly influence Air Force dialogue on in-
formation-based future war. In that article, Colonel 
Jensen states that “the Tofflers provide probably the 
clearest and most accurate explanation of how this new 
type of warfare evolved.” 1 
Before the Air Force openly embraces the 
Tofflerian trinity of agrarian, industrial, and informa­
tional war forms, some well-informed reflection should 
first take place. This reflection requires an understand­
ing of the three dominant theories of future war cur­
rently debated in the military journals— fourth-gen­
eration warfare, third-wave war, and fourth-epoch war. 2 
Specifically, these modes of warfare and perspectives 
on the revolution in political and military affairs 
(RPMA) need to be analyzed because these assump­
tions provide the foundations behind each theory’s pro­
jections of future warfare. 3 Instances where the meth­
odology behind such assumptions falls short should thus 
be a cause for concern because if a theory cannot accu­
rately explain past modes of warfare and military revo­
lutions, it will surely be unable to account for future 
ones. 
Only after such analysis is undertaken can Air Force 
officers decide what attributes of the Tofflerian frame-
work, and potentially those of the competing frame-
works, should be utilized in the creation of post-
Clausewitzian principles of future warfare. 4 This ar­
ticle provides an overview and synopsis of each com­
peting theory, discusses its impact and shortcomings, 
and offers a limited conceptual comparison so that such 
informed decisions can begin to be independently made. 
*This essay was adapted from a lecture given in the National Security Studies MA program at California State University, San 
Bernardino, in the spring of 1995. The contributions of Dr Mark T. Clark, Dr Steven Metz, and Capt Scott Smith, USAF, toward this 
essay are acknowledged. All errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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Fourth-Generation Warfare 
(1989) 
This theory of warfare was developed by William 
S. Lind and four officers from the Army and the US 
Marine Corps (USMC). 5 Mr Lind, who has served as a 
legislative aide for two senators, is the director of a 
conservative think tank and is an authority on maneu­
ver warfare. Fourth-generation warfare is primarily a 
tactical-level theory, which at times straddles the op­
erational level, set in the modern era from about the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the present (table 1). It 
was published concurrently in the October 1989 issue 
of Marine Corps Gazette and Military Review. 
This theory is based on a qualitative dialectic stem­
ming from the clash of thesis and antithesis and has 
not been satisfactorily developed. The introduction of 
either new technology or ideas is viewed as the basis 
for each succeeding generation of warfare. Military 
revolutions in this context are viewed as tactical, pos­
sibly operational, innovations in warfare that yield a 
decisive advantage to whoever adapts to them first. For 
this reason, the current military revolution would be 
considered comparable in scope to the one that took 
place back in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In response to articles by this author and Lt Col 
Thomas X. Hammes, Lind and two Marine colleagues 
did a reappraisal of this theory in the December 1994 
Marine Corps Gazette in which their theoretical per­
spectives went basically unchanged. 6 Ideas, not tech­
nology, would dominate future warfare. These authors 
only took the further step of voicing strong opinions 
concerning the potential fragmentation of American 
society due to the abandonment of Judeo-Christian cul­
ture. 
First-Generation Warfare (Technology) 
This form of warfare, which developed in about 1648, 
was based on the smoothbore musket and tactics cen­
tering on the line and column. This generation of war-
fare was linear and saw the fielding of small profes­
sional armies that relied upon rigid drill to maximize 
firepower. Interestingly, the French revolutionary 
armies with their low training levels and massive man-
power levees were included in this generation. These 
armies represented the antithesis of the Prussian mili­
tary system that had earlier dominated this mode of 
warfare. 
Before the AirForce openly 
embraces the Tofflerian trinity . . . 
some well-informed reflection 
should first take place. 
Second-Generation Warfare (Technology) 
The second generation “was a response to the rifled 
musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machine gun 
and indirect fire.” 7 Tactics remained essentially linear 
even though fire and movement now became common 
as troops dispersed laterally. Massed firepower replaced 
massed manpower as indirect fire began to dominate 
the battlefield. This generation saw the formal recog­
nition and adoption of the operational art devised by 
the Prussians. 
Third-Generation Warfare (Ideas) 
Third-generation warfare was based on ideas rather than 
technology. German infiltration tactics devised in 
World War I were truly nonlinear, which resulted in 
maneuver instead of attrition beingrelied upon to de­
stroy an opposing force. These concepts were then ap­
plied to the development of the tank and abstracted to 
the operational level to form the basis of World War II 






GENERATION PERIOD BASIS 
First 1648 to present Technology 
Second 1815 to present Technology 
Third 1918 to present Ideas 
Fourth Emerging Technology 
Fourth Emerging Ideas 
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Fourth-Generation Warfare (Technology) 
Originally proposed in a 1989 article by Lind and oth­
ers as one of the two alternative forms of future war-
fare which might develop, this warfare path was aban­
doned by these authors for their idea-based path once 
this theory became linked with Dr Martin van Creveld’s 
1991 book The Transformation of War. This is unfor­
tunate because the potential offered by directed-energy 
weaponry, robotics, and media-based operations envi­
sioned in the technology warfare path was generally 
accurate and has been addressed by both of the other 
theories embodied in this essay. 
Fourth-Generation Warfare (Ideas) 
The emerging fourth generation proposed by Lind and 
others is now envisioned to be firmly based on ideas, 
specifically non- Western ones. Terrorism, which by-
passes traditional military forces and directly strikes at 
a nation’s civilian populations, is viewed as a major 
component of this mode of warfare. The transnational 
or nonnational basis of terrorism makes it extremely 
difficult to attack. Ultimately, this form of warfare is 
nontrinitarian in character and, for that reason, is post-
Clausewitzian. 
Impact. While simultaneously published in both a 
Marine Corps and an Army journal, this theory has gone 
on to have a greater impact on the Marine Corps than 
the other services. This impact has apparently devel­
oped because of the Marine Corps’s greater interest in 
low-intensity conflict, insurgency, and terrorism upon 
which the theory is focused (i.e., the other form of fu­
ture war that is developing). Because fourth-genera­
tion theory focuses more on the subnational and non-
Western threat to our government than on actually pro­
viding any suggestions on what should be done to 
counter it, its influence on the Marine Corps has re­
mained limited. This theory has had no discernible in­
fluence on Air Force, Navy, or Army thinking. 
Criticisms. Strong criticism of this theory first ap­
peared in an Autumn 1993 Parameters article written 
by Maj Kenneth McKenzie, USMC. 8 His well-crafted 
and persuasive arguments were directed at the theory’s 
flawed methodological and historical underpinnings. 
Arguments against its relevancy, however, were less 
successful and were met by strong commentary deliv­
ered by van Creveld in thefollowing issue. 9 
I directed criticisms against the methodological and 
historical attributes of this theory in a September 1994 
Marine Corps Gazette article. Of specific concern was 
that the decoupling of technology and ideas results in 
an inaccurate mode of warfare modeling. Still, while it 
was suggested that the far larger and more encompass­
ing fourth-epoch paradigm better explained the “mili­
tary revolution” of our changing modern world, the 
theory of Lind and the others was acknowledged as 
visionary. 
Criticism and support in a number of March 1995 
Marine Corps Gazette articles have now focused on 
the five-year reappraisal of fourth-generation warfare. 10 
That reappraisal has generated a controversial debate 
over the basic utility of this theory and where Ameri­
can society and the Marine Corps are now heading. 
Third-Wave War (1993) 
An early published reference to third-wave war can 
be dated to a 1991 Los Angeles Times article written 
by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. 11 It was not until the publi­
cation of their 1993 book, War and Anti-War: Survival 
at the Dawn of the 21st Century, that the third-wave 
war theory became widely known. 12 Alvin Toffler is 
one of the best-known futurists of the twentieth cen­
tury. He has served as a Washington correspondent, as 
an associate editor of Fortune, as a visiting scholar, 
and as a consultant to major corporations. Along with 
his wife, Heidi, he has written numerous books and 
articles that have popularized their ideas. 
War and Anti-War is a continuation of these ear­
lier writings and the first attempt by these authors to 
Table 2 
Tofflerian Waves 
WAVE WHEN DEVELOPED MODE OF PRODUCTION 
First 8,000 B.C. Agricultural 
Second C. A.D. 1690 Industrial 
Third Current Knowledge 
Source: Robert J. Bunker, "The Tofflerian Paradox," Military Review, May-June 1995, 100. 
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analyze military matters. War is viewed as an exten­
sion of how wealth is made in a society. For this rea­
son, it is subordinate to society’s prevailing mode of 
production. Much like Marxist materialism without the 
accompanying normative baggage, this theory views 
humanity as developing three waves (e.g., “super-civi­
lizations”) over the course of its history (table 2). 
Military revolutions in this theory are viewed as 
monumental events that mark the development of new 
war forms: 
A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs 
only when a new civilization arises to challenge 
the old, when an entire society transforms itself, 
forcing its armed services to change at every level 
simultaneously—from technology and culture to or­
ganization, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics. 
When this happens, the relationship of the military 
to the economy and society is transformed, and the 
balance of power on earth is shattered. 13 
According to this perception, the military revolu­
tion we are now witnessing is viewed to be as signifi­
cant as that of the French Revolution of the late eigh­
teenth century. 
First-Wave War (Agricultural) 
This war form is based on poorly organized, poorly 
equipped, and poorly led armies that engage in sea­
sonal fighting. Orders are verbal, pay is irregular and 
usually in-kind, and the nature of killing is face-to-face. 
First-wave civilizations engaged in this form of war 
range from classical Greece and feudal Europe to an­
cient China. The Roman legions at their peak were iden­
tified as an exception to this concept. 
Second-Wave War (Industrial) 
The second-wave war form is viewed as representa­
tive of industrial civilization. Mass armies using stan­
dardized weaponry pro- duced on assembly lines en-
gage in unlimited warfare based on attrition. Officers 
are now educated in military academies and orders are 
delivered in writing. The machine gun and mechanized 
forces have caused the develop- ment of entirely new 
tactics. War shifted from a struggle between rulers to 
one between peoples embodied by nation-states. This 
war form reached its apex of destructive potential with 
the development of huge nuclear arsenals stockpiled 
by the superpowers. 
Third-Wave War (Knowledge) 
This emerging war form is based on a new economy 
that is information-driven. 14 This is the most extensively 
written about war form envisioned by the Tofflers. Pre­
cision guided munitions, robots, nonlethal tech- nology, 
directed-energy weaponry, and computer viruses are 
all viewed as attributes of third-wave war. 
Demassification, niche capabilities, and cyberwar are 
also discussed, and, as a result, have served to better 
inform military officers about advanced technology de­
velopments. 
Along with the presentation of these intriguing and 
exotic technologies is a multitude of questions con­
cerning their potential military impact and feasibility. 
The implications of such technologies on military eth­
ics and societal ideals are, unfortunately, too often ig­
nored. Still, the envisioned third-wave war form is post-
Clausewitzian in nature and correct in many of its tech­
nical implications. 
Impact. Third-wave war theory, with its futuristic 
andhigh-technology orientation, has had a significant 
impact on the thinking of senior Army officials, spe­
cifically Gen Gordon R. Sullivan , the former Army 
chief of staff. As a result, some of its ideas are directly 
tied to the creation of the “Information Age Army” 
envisioned in Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations. 
Further, its waves of war have appeared in at least one 
official Army publication, and the Tofflers are con­
stantly quoted by Army officers in military symposia. 
Its institutional influence on the Army may be transi­
tory, however, now that General Sullivan has retired. 
Because the Marine Corps and Navy are now only be-
ginning to enter the advanced technology aspect of the 
RPMA debate, this concept of war has had little mea­
surable impact on either service. As mentioned in the 
introduction, third-wave war ideas are now finding their 
way into the Air Force debate, which is currently cen­
tered on the informational aspects of future war. 
Criticisms. Criticism of Tofflerian theory is slowly 
mounting as its influence on the Army’s senior leader-
ship has now become apparent. While a number of its 
forward-looking aspects are viewed as significant con­
tributions toward future war-fighting thought, its waves 
of war—as Col Richard Swain (USA, Retired), Dr 
Steven Metz, and I have shown—have no basis in his­
torical reality.15 
Dr Metz, a former professor at the Air War Col­
lege, while expressing concerns over the popularity of 
third-wave war theory with the military, went on to 
quietly downplay the theory’s significance in the Win­
ter 1994–95 edition of Parameters. In a May–June 1995 
Military Review essay, I launched a far more direct as­
sault on its utility by specifically arguing that its envi­
sioned war forms are severely flawed and, as a result, 
5 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1996 
may be more of a burden than a benefit to the Army’s 
RPMA debate. 
The Tofflers are correct that a monumental trans-
formation is embracing our society. Because they are 
first and foremost futurists, however, they have unfor­
tunately had to rationalize this transformation by in­
terpreting history so that it would conform to their ab­
stract theory of super civilizations. 
Fourth-Epoch War (1994) 
This theory of war was developed in 1987 by Dr 
T. Lindsay Moore and this author in a research semi­
nar on classical warfare at the Claremont Graduate 
School. We are actively teaching at the graduate level 
in the field of national security studies and rely prima­
rily on historical analysis in our research endeavors. 
The concept of fourth-epoch war is based on a politi­
cal science theory that examines the development of 
Western civilization over the last2,500 years. Societal 
energy foundation change, which directly impacts pol­
ity forms and their economic and military systems, 
drives the assumptions behind this theory. The theory 
itself is concerned with the rise and fall of political 
communities, cyclical eras of mercenary domi­
nance, and evolving modes of Western warfare. 
Because of the immense national security con­
cerns this theory raises, it has purposefully been 
developed over the last nine years for applied use 
by US military and governmental policymakers. 
While broad in scope, many components of 
fourth-epoch war have many components that are 
still unpublished. Documents pertaining to this 
theory have existed since 1989, with part of the 
theory being first put forth in a September 1994 
Marine Corps Gazette article.16 To date, only the 
land warfare attributes of this still-evolving theory 
have been published. 
This theory divides Western civilization into 
four energy-based epochs (table 3). Each epoch 
is composed of one or more energy sequences, 
each of which expresses its own unique modes of 
warfare based on the experimental and institution­
alized exploitation of a given form of energy (e.g., 
human, animal, machine, engine, postengine). 
Military systems are viewed as a synthesis of tech-
Table 3

Energy and War in Western Civilization

EPOCH ENERGY WARFARE 
Classical Experimental Human Hellenic 
Classical Institutionalized Human Roman 
Medieval External Threat Raider 
Medieval Experimental Animal Vassal 
Medieval Institutionalized Animal Feudal 
Modern Experimental Machine Dynastic 
Modern Institutionalized Machine Absolutist 
Modern Experimental Engine Corporate 
Modern Institutionalized Engine Modern 
Post-Modern External Threat Non-Western* 
Post-Modern Experimental Post-Engine Advanced Techology 
*Formerly Terrorist/Low-Intensity Conflict

Source: Robert J. Bunker, "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette , September 1994, 22.
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nology and ideas that qualitatively differ between 
modes of warfare. 
Military revolutions in this context are viewed as 
the attainment of a new energy threshold by Western 
civilization. Intraepochal military revolutions (i.e., 
within an energy paradigm) are viewed as significantly 
less disruptive phenomena, while interepochal military 
revolutions (i.e., between energy paradigms) are viewed 
as massive civilization-changing events. 
If a theory cannot accurately 
explain past modes of warfare 
and military revolutions, it 
will surely be unable to 
account for future ones. 
Based on the historical trends isolated in this theory, 
the current RPMA represents an interepochal military 
revolution that will place the survival of the current 
dominant polity form, the nation-state, in considerable 
doubt and, as a result, will ultimately give rise to a 
postmodern form of political community. This mili­
tary revolution, now only in its early stages, is viewed 
as being equal in magnitude to that of the European 
Renaissance. 
First-Epoch War (Human Energy) 
First-epoch war existed within the classical world and 
was based on the exploitation of human forms of en­
ergy. The two modes of warfare that developed were 
Hellenic warfare, which was based on the phalanx, and 
Roman warfare, which was based on the legion. The 
economy during this entire era was based on slave-hold­
ing, thecity-state was the basis of the political commu­
nity, and the dominant ideological paradigm was 
founded on virtue (i.e., the relationships and differences 
between masters and slaves). 
Second-Epoch War (Animal Energy) 
War in the second epoch took place within the Medi­
eval world. This epoch contains three modes of war-
fare and is based on the exploitation of animal forms 
of energy. The raiders on the borders of Europe intro­
duced mass cavalry-based warfare, which resulted in 
the fall of Rome and a period of barbarism in the West. 
The successor states to the Western half of this great 
empire responded by means of the development of in­
digenously based cavalry forces. Under the later feu­
dal monarchies, these forces evolved into knights. The 
economy during this civilization epoch was based on 
fief-holding, the feudal state became the dominant pol­
ity form, and ideology rested on Divine Providence 
under the vestiges of the Church. 
Third-Epoch War (Mechanical Energy) 
The modern, or third, epoch of war exists in a mechani­
cal-based energy paradigm. This paradigm contains two 
energy sequences of machine- and engine-based en­
ergy, respectively. The first energy sequence, based on 
machine energy, saw the rise of mercenary armies dur­
ing the dynastic era and their eventual institutionaliza­
tion during the Age of Absolutism. Mercantilism rep­
resented the dominant mode of production, while dy­
nastic states represented the major political form. The 
second energy sequence, based on engine energy, wit­
nessed the rise of corporate warfare ushered in by 
Napoleonic France in its early stage and the develop­
ment of the German concept of blitzkrieg warfare in 
its later and more modern institutionalized stage. Capi­
talism replaced mercantilism as the basis of the 
economy, and the nation-state replaced the dynastic 
state as the focal point of political organization. 
Fourth-Epoch War (Postmechanical Energy) 
Fourth-epoch war represents the emerging warfare of 
the postmodern world. Two initial modes of warfare, 
based on postmechanical energy sources, are now de­
veloping. These are non-Western and advanced tech­
nology warfare, respectively. Non-Western warfare is 
based on the blending of terrorism and low-intensity 
conflict (LIC) as a challenge to the West’s dominance 
in modern warfare. This is a mode of warfare that is 
equivalent in many respects to idea-based,fourth- gen­
eration warfare. 17 Further, the increasing urbanization 
of the developing nations of the world is envisioned as 
negating much of the current dominance in modern war 
held by the West in its overseas operations. This domi­
nance negation results because of the degradation of 
qualitative weapon superiority in the restrictive terrain 
of sprawling urban slums and the problem of distin­
guishing individual combatants from masses of inno­
cent civilians. 
Advanced technology warfare represents the rise 
of new military technologies such as precision guided 
weapons, information warfare, nonlethal weaponry, 
robotic war-fighting units, and directed-energy weap­
onry. Both Lind and the Tofflers recognize this rise of 
new technologies; however, only the Tofflers fully in-
corporate it into their projection of future war. While 
the Tofflers view the US Army in the Gulf War as hav­
ing adapted Tofflerian doctrine to such advanced tech­
nology, I argue that it has been used in no more than a 
“strap-on” role and has not significantly altered 
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AirLand Battle doctrine based on modern war-fight­
ing principles. 
Impact. The impact of fourth-epoch war theory has 
been limited, although it has contributed toward the 
redirection of the theoretical debate in the Marine Corps 
away from maneuver warfare and toward both the ad­
vanced technology and non-Western warfare aspects 
of the RPMA.18 Directed toward the Army, this theory 
is now being used to help challenge the basic premises 
behind the operations-other-than-war (OOTW) con­
cept, politico-military force implications of nonlethal 
technology, and fundamental concepts of battlespace. 19 
No impact on the Air Force or the Navy has been noted 
other than an initial query from Naval Doctrine Com­
mand concerning the naval applications of this theory. 
Criticisms. No in-depth criticisms have had time 
to develop in reaction to this theory. Past commentary 
has mentioned its failure to address developments in 
air warfare, the lack of emphasis on advanced infor­
mation technology, the nonreflection of the reality of 
battle, and the overreliance on a single-factor (i.e., en­
ergy) explanation of historical change. As more com­
ponents of this theory are published, stronger criticisms 
such as those voiced by Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak 
(USMC, Retired) will undoubtedly be directed towards 
the theory.20 
. . . Third-wave war theory, 
however, may be critically 
flawed. 
Conclusion 
As I have stated, the Tofflers have promoted the 
most popularized theory of future war. Components of 
their third-wave war theory, however, may be critically 
flawed. For that reason, it should be compared to the 
other two theories highlighted in thisessay before it is 
acknowledged as the authoritative work on this sub­
ject. To aid in this comparison, the modes of warfare 
qualitatively modeled in each framework have been 
placed side-by-side for analysis (table 4). 
The subepochs contained within fourth-epoch war 
provide the most detailed modal delineations of West-
ern history for the three theories presented in this es­
say. The reason for this is that this theory was first and 
foremost a model of historical trends and only in the 
last few years has it begun to be used to forecast future 
modes of warfare. Against the modes of warfare ex-
pressed in fourth-epoch theory, the waves of war envi­
sioned by the Tofflers appear as what they are—super­
ficial “MTV clips.” 21 
The generations of modern war developed by Lind 
and his colleagues, on the other hand, hold up quite 
well to the subepochs of this theory. The reason for 
this is that their generations approximate actual modes 
of warfare that have existed over the last few centu-
ries.22 Given the governmental and military back-
grounds of the developers of fourth-generation war-
fare theory, their accuracy is not at all surprising. 
A further comparison of these theories can be made 
regarding their perception of the current RPMA now 
taking place (table 5). The fourth generationalists origi­
nally viewed the current military revolution on a scale 
to that which took place back in the 1920s and 1930s 
with the development of armor, carrier aviation, and 
concepts of amphibious and strategic bombing opera-
tions.23 Their theory cannot account for greater magni­
tudes of change because of its limited level of analy­
sis. By linking it to the work of Dr Martin van Creveld, 
however, its authors now promote the perception that 
war will be waged outside of the nation-state frame-
work and will possess nontrinitarian characteristics. 
The Tofflers suggest that the current military revo­
lution is equivalent in magnitude to that of the French 
Revolution. Besides change at the tactical and opera­
tional level, significant human civilization change is 
foreseen. Knowledge will become the new form of 
wealth, and, as a result, new economic, political, so­
cial, and military structures will develop. Because their 
abstract concepts have no basis in Western history, 
however, their “civilization waves” are flawed and 
therefore improperly articulate the historical process 
that is now taking place. 24 
Fourth-epoch war theory recognizes that both tac­
tical and operational change along with economic, po­
litical, social, and military structure change will take 
place. This theory, however, views the current mili­
tary revolution as equivalent to that of the European 
Renaissance. Because of this perception, a shift in the 
energy foundation of Western civilization is foreseen 
along with anaccompanying alteration in the nature of 
politico-military force and the deinstitutionalization of 
political violence (i.e., the loss of the nation-state’s 
monopoly on war). As a result, a corresponding rise in 
military entrepreneurs (e.g., terrorists, guerrilla groups, 
local warlords, private armies, drug cartels, and multi-
national corporations) engaged in warfare will take 
place, bringing into question the political legitimacy, 
and hence survival, of the nation-state during the next 
century.25 
Despite any flaws highlighted in these modal war-
fare and military revolution perceptual comparisons, 
the three dominant theories of future war highlighted 
in this article can each individually still provide a con­
tribution to the emerging RPMA debate within the Air 
Force—although the contribution provided by the 
Tofflers will likely be far smaller than first envisioned. 
For these contributions to be fully understood, how-
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Table 4
















Raider (External Threat) First (Agricultural) N/A 
Vassal (Experimental Animal) First (Agricultural) N/A 
Feudal (Institutionalized Animal) First (Agricultural) N/A 
Dynastic (Experimental Machine) Unexplained N/A 
Absolutist (Institutionaized Machine) Unexplained First (Technology) 
Corporate (Experimental Engine) Second (Industrial) Second (Technology) 
Modern (Institutionalized Engine) Unexplained Third (Ideas) 
Non-Western* (External Threat) Unexplained Fourth (Ideas) 
Advanced Technology Third (Knowledge) Fourth (Technology)
*Formerly Terrorist/Low-Intensity Conflict 
Table 5 
RPMA Equivalence 
FOURTH GENERATION THIRD WAVE FOURTH EPOCH 
Change Equivalent to
1920s and 1930s 








N/A Economic, Political, Social, 
Military Change 
Economic, Political, 
Social, Military Change 





of Political Violence 
Rise of Military
Entrepreneurs 
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ever, the primary documents relating to each theory 
should be explored so that its potential benefit toward 
the development of post-Clausewitzian Air Force op­
erational concepts and principles can be assessed. 
Further, it is imperative that there be serious re­
flection and debate on the historical magnitude of the 
current military revolution now taking place. Failure 
to recognize the true magnitude of the change taking 
place will result in inaccurate assumptions being made 
when formulating strategic and operational concepts. 
As a prime case in point, we must now ask ourselves if 
war is still “a struggle between nation-states or their 
coalitions over the preservation and extension of na­
tional sovereignty” or if it is now rapidly shifting to “a 
struggle between competing forms of social and po­
litical organization over which the eventual successor 
to the nation-state will be built.” 
Notes 
1. Col Owen E. Jensen, USAF, “Information Warfare: 
Principles of Third-Wave War,” Airpower Journal 8, no. 4 
(Winter 1994): 35–36. 
2. Lesser-known theories include Russian “sixth-gen­
eration” warfare and the 10 military revolutions noted by 
Andrew F. Krepinevich. For more on these theories, see Mary 
C. Fitzgerald, “The Russian Military’s Strategy for ` Sixth 
Generation’ Warfare,” Orbis, Summer 1994, 457–76; An-
drew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of 
Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, Fall 1994, 30– 
42. 
3. I developed the RPMA concept because the earlier 
RMA debate ignored the massive political ramifications that 
the development of future warfare will have on our society 
and government. Military change as we are now witnessing 
does not take place in a political vacuum. To my surprise, 
Chuck de Caro, the theorist behind “SoftWar,” had also 
mentioned in conversation at a December 1994SO/LIC con­
ference in Washington, D.C., the need for a new politico-
military construct. My initial usage of the RPMA concept 
can be originally traced to my article “Rethinking OOTW” 
in the November–December 1995 issue of Military Review. 
4. Colonel Jensen’s initial step toward establishing prin­
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